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OWNERSHIP OF LIVING INVENTIONS-
IN RE BERGY*
Statutory protection of new and useful inventions was first provided almost
two centuries ago by Congress' pursuant to its constitutional power "[t]o
promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited
Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writ-
ings and Discoveries." 2  Throughout the years patent laws have provided a
major impetus to scientific and technological advancement by rewarding the
patentee with the right to exclude all others from making, using, or selling
the patented invention for a limited period of time. 3
* The DePaul Law Review wishes to thank Mr. Timothy Gens for his technical assistance
on this Note.
1. The first federal patent statute was enacted shortly after the United States Constitution
became effective. Act of April 10, 1790, ch. 7, 1 Stat. 109 (current version at 35 U.S.C. §§ 1-376
(1976)).
2. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, c. 8. This provision is generally regarded as granting Congress
the power to establish a copyright system and to establish a patent system. See generally Fred-
rico, Commentary on the New Patent Act, 35 U.S.C.A. 1, 1 (1954); Lutz, Patents and Science: A
Clarification of the Patent Clause of the U.S. Constitution, 18 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 50 (1949);
Rich, Principles of Patentability, 28 GEo. WASH. L. REV. 393 (1960).
The constitutionally stated purpose for enacting the patent system is the promotion of prog-
ress in the "useful Arts" rather than in "Science." This was the conclusion of both houses of
Congress in enacting the 1952 Patent Act, Act of July 19, 1952, ch. 950, 66 Stat. 792 (current
version at 35 U.S.C. §§ 1-376 (1976)).
The background, the balanced construction and the usage current then and later,
indicate that the constitutional provision is really two provisions merged into one.
The purpose of the first provision is to promote the progress of science by securing
for limited times to authors the exclusive right to their writings, the word 'science'
in this connection having the meaning of knowledge in general, which is one of its
meanings today. The other provision is that Congress has the power to promote the
progress of useful arts by securing for limited times to inventors the exclusive right
to their discoveries. The first patent law and all patent laws up to a much later
period were entitled 'acts to promote the progress of useful arts.'
H.R. REP. No. 1923, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. 4 (1952); S. REP. No. 1979, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 3
(1952). The term "useful arts" now refers to "technological arts." See In re Bergy, 596 F.2d 952,
959, 201 U.S.P.Q. 352, 359 (C.C.P.A. 1979); In re Waldbaum, 457 F.2d 997, 1003-04, 173
U.S.P.Q. 430, 435 (C.C.P.A. 1972) (Rich, J., concurring); In re Musgrave, 431 F.2d 882, 893,
167 U.S.P.Q. 280, 289-90 (C.C.P.A. 1970).
3. The patent laws encourage scientific and technological advancement by providing to the
holder of a patent the right to prevent all others from making, using, or selling the invention for
seventeen years from the date of issuance. 35 U.S.C. § 154 (1976). The primary purpose of the
patent laws, however, is scientific and technological advancement and is not the reward to the
individual. Sinclair & Carroll Co. v. Interchemical Corp., 325 U.S. 327, 330-31, 65 U.S.P.Q.
297, 299 (1945).
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The subject matter for which a patent may be obtained is set forth in 35
U.S.C. § 101. 4 Because patents deal with inventions, which by their very
nature are entities that are not yet known, the classes of statutory subject
matter in section 101 were constructed by Congress in very general and
prospective terms. Thus, section 101 authorizes the grant of patents for the
invention or discovery of "any new and useful process, machine, manufac-
ture, or composition of matter or any new and useful improvement
thereof." 5  These statutory generalities, however, are occasionally the
source of controversy, especially when the Patent and Trademark Office
(PTO) 6 must determine whether inventions exhibiting certain "unique fea-
tures" 7 constitute statutory subject matter under section 101.
One technological area that has raised such questions involves inventions
of industrially useful microorganisms. 8 The "unique feature" presented by
these microorganism inventions is that they are alive. While section 101 has
been held to provide patent protection for processes that utilize living or-
ganisms, 9 no court until now has ever held that a living organism is patent-
able under section 101. In the recent decision of In re Bergy, 10 the United
States Court of Customs and Patent Appeals (CCPA) held that a living mi-
croorganism is patentable subject matter under section 101 when claimed as
4. Section 101 provides: "Whoever invents or discovers any new and useful process,
machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof,
may obtain a patent thereof', subject to the conditions and requirements of this title." 35 U.S.C.
§ 101 (1976).
5. Id.
6. The Patent and Trademark Office (PTO), an office in the Department of Commerce,
keeps and preserves all records, hooks, drawings, specifications, and anything else pertaining to
patents and trademarks registrations. The statutory provisions pertaining to the establishment
and organization of the PTO are codified in 35 U.S.C. §§ 1-14 (1976).
7. The term "unique features" refers to those characteristics of the invention which have
not been firmly established as patentable subject matter under § 101 by case precedent.
8. Microorganism inventions provide efficient means of producing various pharmaceuticals,
useful chemicals, food additives, and rare enzymes and have proved to be useful in the disposal
of industrial and municipal wastes. The true extent of their potential usefulness is far from
realized. Despite the ever-expanding importance of microbiological advances, the patent protec-
tion granted these advances is considerably less than the protection granted for similar advances
in chemistry, physics, engineering disciplines, and agriculture. See Irons and Sears, Patents in
Relation to Microbiology, 29 ANN. REV. OF MICROBIOLOGY 319 (1975).
9. See City of Milwaukee v. Activated Sludge, Inc., 69 F.2d 577, 21 U.S.P.Q. 69 (7th Cir.
1934), cert.denied, 293 U.S. 576 (1934) (bacteriological purification of sewage); Cameron Septic
Tank Co. v. Village of Saratoga Springs, 159 F. 453 (2d Cir. 1908) (the original septic tank case);
Dick v. Lederle Antitoxin Laboratories, 43 F.2d 628, 6 U.S.P.Q. 40 (S.D.N.Y. 1930) (process
for producing scarlet fever antitoxin by injecting an animal with sterile toxin and obtaining the
antitoxin therefrom).
10. 596 F.2d 952, 201 U.S.P.Q. 352 (C.C.P.A. 1979), cert. granted, 100 S. Ct. 261 (1979).
In Bergy, the court pointed out that "[w]hatever we have to say in these cases is said here,
though much of it was said before, and our prior opinions are to be deemed withdrawn." Id. at
957, 201 U.S.P.Q. at 358.
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either a manufacture or composition of matter. 11 Bergy is the consolidation
of two previous decisions by the CCPA, In re Bergy12 and In re Chak-
rabarty, 13 which both upheld patent claims directed to microorganism in-
ventions. In Bergy, the CCPA also considered another technological area
that has raised questions of statutory subject matter under section 101-
computer programs (software). The difficulty in determining statutory subject
matter with regard to computer programs is exemplified by the 1978 Su-
preme Court decision of Parker v. Flook. 14 Shortly after Flook, the Su-
preme Court summarily vacated the CCPA's decision in Bergy and re-
manded it to the CCPA to be considered in light of Flook. 15
The purpose of this Note is to analyze the basis of the Bergy decision and
to discuss the effect, if any, of the Flook opinion on Bergy. This Note also
analyzes the impact of Bergy on emerging technologies such as recombinant
DNA research, some problems that may emerge in the patenting of mi-
croorganisms, and the possibility of patenting higher life forms. Finally, this
Note discusses why Bergy should be affirmed upon review by the Supreme
Court.
BACKGROUND
The Patent Statute 16
The determination of whether a particular invention is entitled to patent
protection involves a step-by-step analysis of the patent statute. The proper
and logical method, therefore, is first to apply the requirements of section
11. See text accompanying note 21 infra. An invention may be claimed in as many different
statutory classes as it will warrant. Two reasons have been proposed for this:
First, claims to one class are necessarily of different scope than those of another
class and hence the coverage is greater when the claims are cast in a plurality of
statutory classes than when they are all restricted to a single class. Second, some
court may hold that claims in one statutory class are invalid because the invention
belongs in another class.
1 A. DELLER, PATENT CLAIMS § 108, at 217 (2d ed. 1971). Thus, where there is doubt as to
which class an invention properly belongs, it is permissible to direct the claims to two statutory
classes. Id. § 111, at 219-20.
12. 563 F.2d 1031, 195 U.S.P.Q. 344 (C.C.P.A. 1977), vacated sub nom. Parker v. Bergy,
438 U.S. 902, 198 U.S.P.Q. 257 (1978). See Guttag, The Patentability of Microorganisms:
Statutory Subject Matter and Other Living Things, 13 U. RicH. L. REV. 247 (1979) [hereinafter
referred to as Guttag]; Note, The Patentability of Living Organisms Under 35 U.S.C. § 101: In
re Bergy, 58 NEB. L. REV. 303 (1979); Case Comment, The Patentability of Living Organisms
Under 35 U.S.C. § 101: In re Bergy, 91 HARV. L. REV. 1357 (1978).
13. 571 F.2d 40, 197 U.S.P.Q. 72 (C.C.P.A. 1978). See Note, Living Matter Found to be
Patentable. In re Chakrabarty, 11 CONN. L. REV. 311 (1979).
14. 437 U.S. 584, 198 U.S.P.Q. 193 (1978). In Flook, a process for updating alarm limits in
the catalytic conversion of hydrocarbons, in which the only novel feature was a mathematical
formula, was held to be unpatentable subject matter tinder § 101. See note 61 infra.
15. Parker v. Bergy, 438 U.S. 902, 198 U.S.P.Q. 257 (1978).
16. The present patent laws are codified in 35 U.S.C. §§ 1-376 (1976). Title 35 was the
result of the 1952 Patent Act, Act of July 19, 1952, ch. 950, 66 Stat. 792, which revised and
1979]
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101 and then to proceed to the relevant inquiries under section 102 and
103.17 Section 101 states three requirements for patentability: novelty, util-
ity, and statutory subject matter. 18 Of these three requirements, however,
only utility and statutory subject matter are applied under section 101.19
The utility of an invention is basically a subjective determination, for there is
no comprehensive definition of the term "useful" in the law of patents. 20
Statutory subject matter requires that an invention fall into at least one of the
four classes enumerated in section 101-process, machine, manufacture, or
composition of matter. 21
After the court determines that an invention is useful and that statutory
subject matter exists under section 101, the court considers the require-
ments of sections 102 and 103. The essential thrust of section 10222 is that
codified what previously had been a hodgepodge of separate enactments. There are three main
parts to title 35: part one pertains to the establishment and organization of the PTO; part two,
the one involved in Bergy, covers the patentability and the grant of patents; part three relates
to issued patents and the protection of the rights conferred by them. The statutory provisions
which are relevant to Bergy are the first four sections of chapter 10, the first chapter of part
two. These are: 1) § 100 Definitions; 2) § 101 Inventions patentable; 3) § 102 Conditions for
patentability-novelty and loss of right to patent; 4) § 103 Conditions for patentability-non-
obvious subject matter. 35 U.S.C. §§ 100-103 (1976).
17. The court in Bergy analogized the determination of patentability to using "keys to open
in succession the three doors of sections 101, 102, and 103 . 596 F.2d at 960, 201 U.SP.Q.
at 360.
18. See note 4 supra for the text of § 101.
19. That the novelty of an invention should be considered under § 102 and not under § 101
is the apparent intent of Congress. A reviser's note accompanying § 101, when it was enacted in
the 1952 Patent Act, stated: "The corresponding section of the existing statute is split into two
sections, section 101 relating to the subject matter for which patents may be obtained, and
section 102 defining statutory novelty and stating other conditions for patentability." H.R. REP.
No. 1923, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. 6 (1952); S. REP. No. 1979, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. 5 (1952).
In Bergy, the court noted that "[tlhe PTO, in administering the patent laws, has, for the most
part, consistently applied § 102 in making rejections for lack of novelty. To provide the option
of making such a rejection under § 101 or § 102 is confusing and therefore bad law." 596 F.2d
at 961, 201 U.S.P.Q. at 361. The court in Bergy also noted that there have been only two
instances where the PTO has made rejections for lack of novelty under § 101. Id., citing In re
Bergstrom, 427 F.2d 1394, 166 U.S.P.Q. 256 (C.C.P.A. 1970); In re Seaborg, 328 F.2d 996,
140 U.S.P.Q. 662 (C.C.P.A. 1964).
20. See generally I A. DELLER, DELLER'S WALKER ON PATENTS §§ 83-101 (2d ed. 1964)
[hereinafter referred to as DELLER].
21. 35 U.S.C. § 101 (1976).
22. See id. § 102:
A person shall be entitled to a patent unless-
(a) the invention was known or used by others in this country, or patented or de-
scribed in a printed publication in this or a foreign country, before the invention
thereof by the applicant for patent, or
(b) the invention was patented or described in a printed publication in this or a
foreign country or in public use or on sale in this country, more than one year prior
to the date of the application for patent in the United States, or
(c) he has abandoned the invention, or
(d) the invention was first patented or caused to be patented, or was the subject of
an inventor's certificate, by the applicant or his legal representatives or assigns in a
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the invention be novel. The inventor must be the first to invent what he or
she did in substantially the same manner that he or she invented it. The
determination of novelty, therefore, involves a comparison with the prior
art. 23 Next, a patentable invention must meet the nonobviousness re-
quirement of section 103. 24 Under that section, a patent will be allowed
only "if the difference between the subject matter sought to be patented and
the prior art [is] such that the subject matter as a whole would [not] have
been obvious at the time the invention was made to a person ordinarily
skilled in the art .... ."25
Neither section 102 nor section 103 was involved in either appeal in
Bergy. The only question presented was whether or not a living organism
was statutory subject matter under section 101 when claimed as either a
manufacture 2 6 or composition of matter. 27 The microorganisms in Bergy
foreign country prior to the date of the application for patent or inventor's certficate
filed more than twelve months before the filing of the application in the United
States, or
(e) the invention was described in a patent granted on an application for patent by
another filed in the United States before the invention thereof by the applicant for
patent, or on an international application by another who has fulfilled the require-
ments of paragraphs (1), (2), and (4) of section 371(c) of this title before the inven-
tion thereof by the applicant for patent, or
(f) he did not himself invent the subject matter sought to be patented, or
(g) before the applicant's invention thereof the invention was made in this country
by another who had not abandoned, suppressed, or concealed it. In determining
priority of invention there shall be considered not only the respective dates of con-
ception and reduction to practice of the invention, but also the reasonable diligence
of one who was first to conceive and last to reduce to practice, from a time prior to
conception by the other.
23. A practical definition of prior art is "[a]nything in tangible form that may properly be
relied on by the Patent Office under the Patent Statutes and the Patent Office Rules of Practice
in Patent Cases in support of rejection on matter of substance, not form, of claim in pending
application for patent." 5 DELLER, supra note 20, § 453, at 361 (emphasis in original).
24. Section 103 states:
A patent may not be obtained though the invention is not identically disclosed or
described as set forth in section 102 of this title, if the differences between the
subject matter sought to be patented and the prior art are such that the subject
matter as a whole would have been obvious at the time the invention was made to a
person having ordinary skill in the art to which said subject matter pertains. Patent-
ability shall not be negatived by the manner in which the invention was made.
35 U.S.C. § 103 (1976). The requirements of § 103 did not exist in a separate section until the
1952 Patent Act. "Section 103 is a restatement of the rule invalidating patents for lack of inven-
tion or lack of patentable novelty which has long been recognized by the courts and other
authorities but has not before been spelled out in the statute." Zinn, Commentary on New Title
35, U.S. Code "Patents", U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWs 2507, 2513 (1952). For an excellent
discussion of the application of § 103, see Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 148
U.S.P.Q. 459 (1966).
25. 35 U.S.C. § 103 (1976).
26. In American Fruit Growers, Inc. v. Brogdex Co., 283 U.S. 1, 11, 8 U.S.P.Q. 131, 133
(1931), the Supreme Court adopted the following definition of manufacture: "[T]he production
of articles for use from raw or prepared materials by giving to these materials new forms,
1979]
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were claimed as such because a living organisim cannot be claimed as a
process 28 or a machine 29 within the meaning of the patent statute.
In addition to the classes of patentable subject matter under section
101, 3 0 another category of patentable subject matter was created by the
Plant Patent Act of 1930.31 Under that law certain asexually reproduced
plants are patentable. While it may be debatable, in the scientific sense,
whether or not bacteria are "plants," the CCPA, in In re Arzberger,32 held
qualities, properties, or combinations, whether by hand-labor or by machinery." Id., quoting
CENTURY DICTIONARY (1911).
In American Fruit, the inventor claimed that an orange in which the rind had been impreg-
nated with borax to resist mold was a "manufacture". In applying the aforesaid definition of
manufacture to the impregnated fruit, the Supreme Court held:
Addition of borax to the rind of natural fruit does not produce from the raw material
an article for use which possesses a new or distinctive form, quality or property.
The added substance only protects the natural article against deterioration by in-
hibiting development of extraneous spores upon the rind. There is no change in the
name, appearance, or general character of the fruit. It remains a fresh orange fit
only for the same beneficial uses as theretofore.
Id. at 11-12, 8 U.S.P.Q. at 133. This holding has been criticized as applying too strict a defini-
tion to the term manufacture. See Cuttag, supra note 12, at 257. Comment, Patent Law-
Patentability as Affected by the Law of Nature Rules-The Kalo Doctrine, 47 MIcH. L. REV.
391, 396 (1949).
27. Composition of matter has been defined as "the mixing of two or more ingredients
resulting in a product with several different or additional properties not possessed individually
by the several ingredients." P.E. Sharpless Co. v. Crawford Farms, Inc., 287 F. 655, 658 (2d
Cir. 1923).
28. "The term 'process' means process, art or method, and includes a new use of a known
process, machine, manufacture, composition of matter, or material." 35 U.S.C. § 100(b) (1976).
The Supreme Court had defined process as "a mode of treatment of certain materials to produce
a given result. It is an act, or series of acts, performed upon the subject matter to be trans-
formed and reduced to a different state or thing." Cochrane v. Deener, 94 U.S. 780, 788 (1876).
The generic definition of a process is "an operation performed by rule to produce a result."
1 DELLER, supra note 20, § 15, at 106.
29. "The term 'machine' includes every mechanical device or combination of mechanical
powers and devices to perform some function and produce a certain affect or result." Corning v.
Burden, 56 U.S. (15 How.) 252, 267 (1853).
30. The four classes of statutory subject matter enumerated in § 101 relate to patents for
invention or "utility" patents. In addition to utility patents there are also "design" patents which
are provided for in 35 U.S.C. §§ 171-173 (1976). Section 171 provides patent protection for
"[w]hoever invents any new, original and ornamental design for an article of manufacture ....
31. Act of May 23, 1930, Pub. L. No. 245, 246 Stat. 376 (amending R.S. § 4886). The
statutory provision for plant patents is 35 U.S.C. § 161 (1976), which provides:
Whoever invents or discovers and asexually reproduces any distinct and new va-
riety of plant, including cultivated spores, mutants, hybrids, and newly found seed-
lings, other than a tuber propagated plant or a plant found in an uncultivated state,
may obtain a patent therefor, subject to the conditions and requirements of this
title.
The provisions of this title relating to patents for inventions shall apply to patents
for plants, except as otherwise provided.
32. 112 F.2d 834, 46 U.S.P.Q. 32 (C.C.P.A. 1940). Although the court in Arzberger recog-
nized that bacteria were scientifically regarded as plants, it concluded that "Congress, in the use
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that there was no evidence that Congress intended the term "plant" to cover
bacteria. Thus, the microorganisms in Bergy could only be found to be pat-
entable subject matter under one of the classes enumerated in section 101.
Facts and Procedure
Bergy is the consolidation of two previous decisions by the CCPA, In re
Bergy 3 and In re Chakrabarty.3 4  The judicial history of these two cases is
unique and the source of potential confusion.
Chakrabarty
With an intent to develop a possible solution to the problem of dispersing
oil spills, Dr. Ananda Chakrabarty35 invented a new strain of the genus of
bacterium Pseudomonas, which possessed the unique capability of breaking
down several of the component hydrocarbon compounds of crude oil. 36
Chakrabarty's new microorganism was developed by the transfer of certain
energy-generating plasmids, 37 each containing different pathways of hy-
drocarbon degradation, 3 8 to the existing strain of Pseudornonas aeruginosa,
which itself exhibited no capacity for degrading any component of oil. The
resulting new strain had the capacity to produce the enzymes required to
degrade several of the main hydrocarbon components of oil.
Chakrabarty's patent application 3 9 contained thirty-six claims.4° The pat-
ent examiner allowed those claims directed to a process or an improvement
of the word 'plant', was speaking'in the common language of the people', and did not use the word in its
strict, scientific sense." Id. at 838, 46 U.S.P.Q. at 35.
33. 563 F.2d 1031, 195 U.S.P.Q. 344 (C.C.P.A. 1977), vacated sub nom. Parker v. Bergy,
438 U.S. 902, 198 U.S.P.Q. 257 (1978).
34. 571 F.2d 40, 197 U.S.P.Q. 72 (C.C.P.A. 1978).
35. Dr. Chakrabarty is an employee of the General Electric Company, the real party in
interest a4 the assignee of the patent application. 596 F.2d at 956, 201 U.S.P.Q. at 357.
36. Id. at 968-69, 201 U.S.P.Q. at 367-68.
37. A plasmid is believed to consist of double stranded DNA (deoxyribonucleic acid)
molecules. Plasmid is "a term coined to include both intrinsic plasmogenes and extrinisic factors
such as viruses, the effect of which may be mistaken for that of a true plasmogene." P. GRAY,
THE DICTIONARY OF THE BIOLOGICAL SCIENCEs 409 (1967).
38. A degradative pathway is " 'a sequence of ensymatic reactions (e.g., 5 to 10 enzymes are
produced by the microbe) converting the primary substrate (i.e., oil) to some simple metabolite,
a normal food substance for microorganism.' " 596 F.2d at 969, 201 U.S.P.Q. at 368, quoting
Chakrabarty's patent application.
39. 35 U.S.C. § 111 (1976) provides in part that each patent application shall include: "(1) a
specification as prescribed by section 112 of this title; (2) a drawing as prescribed by section 113
of this title; and (3) an oath by the applicant as prescribed by section 115 of this title."
Section 112 requires in part that:
[Tihe specification shall contain a written description of the invention, and of the
manner and process of making and using it, in such full, clear, concise, and exact
terms as to enable any person skilled in the art to which it pertains, or with which
1979]
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in a process of transferring plasmids from a donor to a recipient bacterium 4
as well as those claims directed to an inoculated medium.42 The claims
directed to a bacterium 43 or to an inoculum 4 4 were rejected, however, on
the ground that the microorganism was a "product of nature" and as such
was unpatentable. 45
On appeal, the PTO Board of Appeals 46 erroneously interpreted the
examiner's answer as stating two grounds for the rejection of the claimed
it is most nearly connected, to make and use the same, and shall set forth the best
mode contemplated by the inventor of carrying out his invention.
The specification shall conclude with one or more claims particularly pointing out
and distinctly claiming the subject matter which the applicant regards as his inven-
tion.
40. 596 F.2d at 970, 201 U.S.P.Q. at 369.
41. Id. The claims directed to the process were 27, 28, and 29. Id.
42. Id. at 970-71, 201 U.S.P.Q. at 369. The claims directed to the inoculated medium were
30, 31, 32, 35, and 36. The only independent claim was 30, which reads:
An inoculated medium for the degradation of liquid hydrocarbon substrate material
floating on water, said inoculated medium comprising a carrier material able to float
on water and bacteria from the genus Pseudomonas carried thereby, at least some of
said bacteria each containing at least two stable energy-generating plasmids, each of
said plasmids providing a separate hydrocarbon degradative pathway and said car-
rier material being able to absorb said hydrocarbon material.
Id,
43. The claims directed to the bacterium were 7, 8, 9, 13, 17, and 21. Id. at 970-71, 201
U.S.P.Q. at 369. Representative of these claims is claim 7, which reads: "A bacterium from the
genus Pseudornonas containing therein at least two stable energy-generating plasmids, each of
said plasmids providing a separate hydrocarbon degradative pathway." Id. The court in Bergy
also noted that the assignee of Chakrabarty's invention, General Electric Company, has been
granted British Patent 1,436,573, containing claim 7 and other claims to the bacterium. Id. at
970 n.9, 201 U.S.P.Q. at 369 n.9.
44. The claims directed to the inoculum were 21, 24, 25, and 26. Id. at 970, 201 U.S.P.Q. at
369. The only independent claim, number 21 reads as follows:
An inoculum for the degradation of a preselected substrate comprising a complex or
mixture of hydrocarbons, said inoculum consisting essentially of bacteria of the
genus Pseudomonas at least some of which contain at least two stable energy-
generating plasmids, each of said plasmids providing a separate hydrocarbon deg-
radative pathway.
Id. In Bergy, the court noted that "claims 7 and 21 are but alternative ways of claiming substan-
tially the same thing since the inoculum consists essentially of the bacterium." Id.
45. Id. at 971, 201 U.S.P.Q. at 369. A claimed invention that is a "product of nature" is not
eligible for patent protection because it is not "new" within the meaning of the patent statute.
In contrast, a natural product claimed in a pure state or with some other characteristics which
differentiate it from its natural state is patentable. See Merck v. Olin Mathieson Chemical, 253
F.2d 156, 116 U.S.P.Q. 484 (4th Cir. 1958) (vitamin B-12); Merck v. Chase Chemical, 273 F.
Supp. 68, 155 U.S.P.Q. 139 (D.N.J. 1967) (same); Parke-Davis v. Mulford, 196 F. 446 (2d Cir.
1912) (adrenalin); In re Bergstrom, 427 F.2d 1394, 166 U.S.P.Q. 256 (C.C.P.A. 1970) (prosta-
glandin compounds).
46. The statutory provision setting forth the composition and duties of the Board of Appeals
(Board) is 35 U.S.C. § 7 (1976). Section 7 directs that the Board be made up of the Commis-
sioner, the deputy commissioner, the assistant commissioners, and the examiners-in-chief. Id.
Each appeal must be heard by at least three members of the Board which shall be designated
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invention: (1) that they were unpatentable as products of nature, and (2) that
as live organisms they do not fit into any of the categories of patentable
subject matter as defined by section 101. The Board reversed the "product
of nature" ground and sustained the rejections on the ground that living
organisms are not patentable subject matter under section 101. 4 7 The Board
reasoned that Congress could not have intended section 101 to include any
living thing because, if it had, Congress would not have found it necessary
to pass the Plant Patent Act of 1930.48 The Board felt that if Congress did
not intend plants, which are alive, to be statutory subject matter under sec-
tion 101, then nothing that is alive falls within section 101. 4 9
Bergy
Subsequent to the PTO's rejection of Chakrabarty's claims, Malcolm E.
Bergy 50 filed patent applications for a microorganism and a microbiological
process for preparing the antibiotic lincomycin by cultivating the newly dis-
covered microorganism Streptomyces vellosus in an aqueous nutrient
medium under aerobic conditions. The antibiotic had previously been ob-
tainable, though less efficiently, 51 from a different microorganism called
Streptomyces lincolnensis. 52
Bergy's patent application contained four claims directed to the processes
involved, 53 all of which were allowed. The patent examiner, however, re-
jected claim five, 54 which was directed to a biologically-pure culture of the
by the Commissioner. Id. Appeal to the Board is provided for in 35 U.S.C. § 134 (1976), which
states that "[an applicant for a patent, any of whose claims has been twice rejected, may appeal
from the decision of the primary examiner to the Board of Appeals, having once paid the fee for
such appeal." Id.
47. 596 F.2d at 971, 201 U.S.P.Q. at 370.
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Bergy's co-inventors were John H. Coats and Vedpal S. Malik. Id. at 967, 201 U.S.P.Q.
at 366. The real party in interest was The Upjohn Company, as assignee of the patent applica-
tion. Id. at 956, 201 U.S.P.Q. at 357.
51. The reason that Streptomyces vellosus is more efficient is that lincomycin is produced
without the concomitant production of lincomycin B (4'-depropyl-4'-ethyl-lincomycin). The
absence of lincomycin B production results in increased lincomycin recovery efficiency. Id. at
967, 201 U.S.P.Q. at 366.
52. The former process involving Streptonyces lincolnensis was the subject of U.S. Patent
No. 3,086,912. Id.
53. Id. Of claims 1-4 the only independent process claim was claim 1 which reads as follows:
A novel process for preparing the antibiotic lincomycin which comprises cultivating
Streptomyces vellosus, having the identifying characteristics of NRRL 8037, and
licomycin-producing mutants thereof, in an aqueous nutrient medium under aerobic
conditions until substantial antibiotic activity is imparted to said medium by the
production of lincomycin.
Id.
54. Claim 5 was: "A bioligically pure culture of the microorganism Steptomyces vellosus,
having the identifying characteristics of NRRL 8037, said culture being capable of producing the
antibiotic lincomycin in a recoverable quantity upon fermentation in an aqueous nutrient
medium containing assimilable sources of carbon, nitrogen and inorganic substances." Id.
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microorganism Streptomyces vellosus, on the ground that it was a product of
nature. 5 On appeal, the Board sustained the rejection, but, in so doing, it
ignored the ground set forth by the examiner.56 Instead, the Board relied
on the reasoning of the Chakrabarty Board that claim five was properly
rejected because it was drawn to a living organism and, therefore, was
unpatentable subject matter under section 101.11
Due to a delay caused by a request for reconsideration by the PTO in
Chakrabarty, the Bergy appeal was the first to reach the United States
Court of Customs and Patent Appeals. The CCPA reversed the Board's re-
jection of Bergy's claim five. 58 When Chakrabarty then was appealed to
the CCPA, it too was reversed on the basis of the Bergy decision. 59  On
appeal to the Supreme Court, Bergy was summarily vacated6 0 and re-
manded to the CCPA for further consideration in light of Flook.6 1 The
55. Id. at 972, 201 U.S.P.Q. at 370. Bergy responded to the rejection with a request to
reconsider that was supported by affidavits of three Upjohn microbiologists. Id. The affidavits
pointed out that the claimed microorganism (Streptoinyces vellosus) did not exist in nature as a
"biologically pure culture." Id. They also asserted that such a culture is a "manufacture" under
35 U.S.C. § 101 (1976). Id. The point Bergy made is that a "biologically pure culture" is "a
product of a microbiologist." Id. After considering the affidavits, the examiner adhered to his
former position. Id., 201 U.S.P.Q. at 371.
56. Id. These actions by the Board raised a technical procedural question which the court in
Bergy quickly disposed of:
Since In re Wagenhorst, 64 F.2d 780, 20 CCPA 991, 17 USPQ 330 (1933), it has
been the rule that when the board affirms an examiner's rejection generally without
reversing a ground the examiner relied on, that ground is assumed to be affirmed.
See 37 CFR 1.196 (a). We have an anomalous situation here in that the board
affirmed on a new ground without so stating, not reaching the sole ground relied on
by the examiner. Therefore, in case there is doubt as to whether the examiner's
product-of-nature rejection is still an issue in this case, in the interest of judicial
economy we rule on it now. It involves only a question of law and there is sufficient
evidence in the record. . . . We hold that Bergy's claim 5 clearly does not define a
product of nature.
Id. at 972-73, 201 U.S.P.Q. at 371 (emphasis in original).
57. Id. at 972, 201 U.S.P.Q. at 371.
58. In re Bergy, 563 F.2d 1031, 1039, 195 U.S.P.Q. 344, 351 (C.C.P.A. 1977), vacated sub
nom. Parker v. Bergy, 438 U.S. 902, 198 U.S.P.Q. 257 (1978).
59. In re Chakrabarty, 571 F.2d 40, 43, 197 U.S.P.Q. 72, 75 (C.C.P.A. 1978).
60. Parker v. Bergy, 438 U.S. 902, 198 U.S.P.Q. 257 (1978).
61. See notes 14, 15, and accompanying text supra. Flook's patent application concerned a
process claim for a mathematical algorithm ("[a] procedure for solving a given type of mathe-
matical problem"). Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 585 n.1, 198 U.S.P.Q. 193, 195 n.1 (1978),
quoting Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 65, 175 U.S.P.Q. 673, 674 (1972)), which provided
a more efficient method of updating alarm limits during the catalytic conversion of hydrocar-
bons. Flook's claim had previously been allowed by the CCPA in In re Flook, 559 F.2d 21, 195
U.S.P.Q. 9 (C.C.P.A. 1977), since the algorithm was tied to a specific end use and a patent on
the method would not preempt the algorithm. The Supreme Court reversed, however, holding
that because the only novel feature of the claimed method was the algorithm which must be
considered to be part of the prior art, the process was not patentable subject matter under
§ 101 because there was no other inventive concept in its application. Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S.
at 596, 198 U.S.P.Q. at 200 (1978).
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CCPA subsequently vacated its decision in Chakrabarty so that it could be
reconsidered together with Bergy.
ANALYSIS
When the Supreme Court summarily vacated 6 2 the judgment in Bergy
and remanded it to the CCPA for reconsideration in light of Flook, it issued
no directives to indicate what bearing Flook had on Bergy. It was necessary,
therefore, for the CCPA to analyze Flook diligently and to consider every
possible application.
In Bergy, the court found .that the only factor the Bergy and Chakrabarty
appeals had in common with Flook was that both involved section 101.63
The basic issues addressed in Bergy and Flook, however, were distinctly
different. The Bergy court viewed the issue in Flook as the definition of a
"process" under section 101 in the context of computer program protec-
tion; 64 the issue in Bergy was whether a living organism is patentable sub-
ject matter under section 101 as either a manufacture or a composition of
matter. 65 Thus, even though both cases involved section 101, the claims at
issue were directed to different classes of statutory subject matter. 66 Addi-
tionally, Flook involved a claim for an improved method of calculation;
neither of the appeals in Bergy was concerned with methods of calculation.
Thus, the court in Bergy held that the Flook holding had no bearing on
either Bergy or Chakrabarty.67
Judge Baldwin, in his concurring opinion, however, did not agree with
that view. 6S He noted that in the determination of whether an invention
falls into one of the four classes of subject matter in section 101, a literal
interpretation of that section is precluded by Supreme Court precedent
identifying certain categories of nonpatentable subject matter. 69 This prec-
edent established the principle that the discovery of a so-called law of nature
or scientific principle per se cannot form the basis of a patent because the
abstract law or principle does not come within the statutory classes of pa-
tentable inventions. 70 If a patent were allowed on a natural law or scientific
principle per se, the effect would be to preempt all others from using that
law or principle, which is and should remain available for all to use. 7 ' Thus,
the Supreme Court has not allowed claims that attempt to define the limits
of the invention in terms of the natural law or phenomenon involved be-
62. Parker v. Bergy, 438 U.S. 902, 198 U.S.P.Q. 257 (1978).
63. 596 F.2d at 964, 201 U.S.P.Q. at 364.
64. Id. at 964-65, 201 U.S.P.Q. at 364.
65. Id. at 956, 201 U.S.P.Q. at 357.
66. Id. at 964-65, 201 U.S.P.Q. at 364.
67. Id. at 965, 201 U.S.P.Q. at 365.
68. Id. at 988, 201 U.S.P.Q. at 383 (Baldwin, J., concurring).
69. See notes 72-73 infra.
70. See generally 1 DELLEB, supra note 20, § 23.
71. Id.
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cause all others would be preempted from using that phenomenon. 72 Con-
versely, the Supreme Court has allowed claims where the natural laws or
phenomena involved are applied to a practical purpose to produce a new and
useful result and are expressly limited to the claimed invention. 73
Because the Court in Flook reviewed those Supreme Court cases that
have examined the patentability of natural phenomena, Judge Baldwin con-
sidered them to be "particularly germane" to the appeals in Bergy, as both
Bergy's and Chakrabarty's claimed inventions involved natural
phenomena. 74 He felt that prior to the determination of statutory subject
matter under section 101, the court first should ascertain whether or not the
claim attempts to preempt the use of the natural phenomena involved. 75
72. In O'Reilly v. Morse, 56 U.S. (15 How.) 61 (1853), the inventor attempted to define the
limits of his invention of the telegraph in terms of electromagnetism. Morse's claim 8 stated:
I do not propose to limit myself to the specific machinery, or parts of machinery,
described in the foregoing specifications and claims; the essence of my invention
being the use of the motive power of the electric or galvanic current, which I call
electro-magnetism, however developed, for making or printing intelligible charac-
ters, letters, or signs, at any distances, being a new application of that power, of
which I claim to be the first inventor or discoverer.
Id. at 86. Because Morse's claim would have preempted all others from using electromagnetism
in any telegraphic device the Court rejected it, stating:
If this claim can be maintained, it matters not by what process or machinery the
result is accomplished. For aught that we now know some future inventor, in the
onward march of science, may discover a mode of writing or printing at a distance
by means of the electric or galvanic current, without using any part of the process
or combination set forth in the plaintiff's specification. His invention may be less
complicated-less liable to get out of order-less expensive in construction, and in
its operation. But yet if it is covered by this patent the inventor could not use it,
nor the public have the benefit of it without the permission of this patentee.
Id. at 113.
In Funk Brothers Seed Co. v. Kalo Inoculant Co., 333 U.S. 127, 76 U.S.P.Q. 280 (1948), the
inventor attempted to patent an inoculant containing an unspecified, mutually non-inhibitive
mixture of bacteria of the genus Rhizobiuin, which infect the roots of leguminous plants (i.e.
beans, peas) and form nodules and thus enable the plants to transform atmospheric nitrogen
into organic nitrogenous compounds necessary for growth. Because the claim would preempt
the use of the non-inhibitive phenomena of the bacteria, the Court disallowed the claimed
invention, stating:
Discovery of the fact that certain strains of each species of these bacteria can be
mixed without harmful effect to the properties of either is a discovery of their qual-
ities of non-inhibition. It is no more than the discovery of some of the handiwork of
nature and hence is not patentable.
Id. at 131, 76 U.S.P.Q. at 281. Justice Frankfurter noted, however, that if the claim had been
drawn to a specific mixture of the bacteria, a patent would have been issued. Id. at 133, 76
U.S.P.Q. at 282 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
73. In Leroy v. Tatham, 55 U.S. (14 How.) 156 (1852), the inventor implemented a newly
discovered natural phenomenon of lead in the formation of lead pipes. The claim at issue was
allowed because it was expressly limited to the claimed apparatus and did not directly or indi-
rectly preempt the antenna system which utilized principles of electromagnetic wave propaga-
tion and the phenomena of standing waves to achieve new and useful results.
74. 596 F.2d at 988, 201 U.S.P.Q. at 384 (Baldwin, J., concurring).
75. Id. at 996, 201 U.S.P.Q. at 390.
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In Bergy's invention, the natural phenomena are the metabolic processes
by which Streptomyces vellosus synthesizes the antibiotic lincomycin. Ber-
gy's inventive application of these phenomena was the cultivation of Strep-
tomyces vellosus free from impurities under fermentation conditions that
maximize lincomycin production. 76 There was no preemption of the
phenomena involved, because Bergy's claim was directed to a particular
strain of Streptomyces and there are other strains of Streptomyces that are
also capable of synthesizing lincomycin. 77 In Chakrabarty's invention, the
natural phenomenon was the metabolic degradation of hydrocarbon com-
pounds. Chakrabarty's inventive application of this phenomenon is the crea-
tion of a new strain of Pseudornonas, achieved by the transfer of plasmids,
which possess hydrocarbon degradative pathways. 78 Chakrabarty's claim
was limited to those strains of Pseudononas containing two or more of these
plasmids. 79 There was no preemption of the phenomena because other
strains of Pseudomonas exist that possess only one such plasmid. 80  Thus,
Judge Baldwin agreed with the majority that the claimed microorganisms in
Bergy define statutory inventions. 81
The Bergy court also considered a passage from Deepsouth Packing Co. v.
Laitram Corp.,82 adopted by the Court in Flook, 83 indicating that patent
rights should not be expanded by overruling or modifying prior judicial in-
terpretation of the patent statute without a clear and certain signal from
Congress. 84 The Bergy court found no relevance in this passage, 85 because
76. 596 F.2d at 967, 201 U.S.P.Q. at 366.
77. As Bergy noted in his patent application, Streptomyces lincolnensis also possesses the
capability to produce lincoinycin. Id.
78. Id. at 968-69, 201 U.S.P.Q. at 367-68.
79. See note 43 supra.
80. 596 F.2d at 997, 201 U.S.P.Q. at 391 (Baldwin, J., concurring).
81. Id.
82. 406 U.S. 518, 173 U.S.P.Q. 769 (1972).
83. Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 596, 198 U.S.P.Q. 193, 200 (1978). In Flook the Court
relied on the passage as an indication that caution must be used when asked to extend the
patent laws into areas wholly unforeseen by Congress.
84. The entire Deepsouth passage which the Flook opinion quoted reads:
[W]e should not expand patent rights by overruling or modifying our prior cases
construing the patent statutes, unless the argument for expansion of privilege is
based on more than mere inference from ambiguous statutory language. We would
require a clear and certain signal from Congress before approving the position of a
litigant who, as respondent here, argues that the beachhead of privilege is wider,
and the area of public use narrower, than the courts had previously thought. No
such signal legitimizes respondent's position in this litigation.
Id. at 596, 198 U.S.P.Q. at 200, quoting Deepsouth Packing Co. v. Laitram Corp., 406 U.S. at
531, 173 U.S.P.Q. at 774. The issue in Deepsouth was whether the selling of unassembled
parts of patented machines to foreign buyers who assembled and used them abroad constituted
patent infringement. The relevant statutory provision, 35 U.S.C. § 271 (1976), explicitly limits
infringement to actions performed within the United States. The precedent that the Court felt it
would be overruling was Dowagiac Mfg. Co. v. Minnesota Moline Plow Co., 235 U.S. 641, 650
(1915), and Brown v. Duchesne, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 183, 195 (1857). Thus, the Court in Deep-
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the issue presented in Bergy was one of first impression in the courts, and
no established precedent was overruled. 86 Thus, the court's holding in
south felt that upholding a claim for patent infringement, when the acts complained of were not
performed in the United States, would be in derogation to established precedent and an exten-
sion of the patent laws which should only be done upon a signal from Congress. Deepsouth
Packing Co. v. Laitrain Corp., 406 U.S. at 531, 173 U.S.P.Q. at 774 (1972).
85. 596 F.2d at 966-67, 201 U.S.P.Q. at 365-66.
86. The PTO, in support of its position that living organisms are unpatentable subject mat-
ter under § 101, was able to cite to only two cases-lit re Mancy, 499 F.2d 1289, 182 U.S.P.Q.
303 (C.C.P.A. 1974) and Guaranty Trust Co. of N.Y. v. Union Solvents Corp., 54 F.2d 400, 12
U.S.P.Q. 47 (D. Del. 1931), aff'd per curtain, 61 F.2d 1041, 15 U.S.P.Q. 237 (3d Cir. 1932),
for dicta which suggested that living organisms are unpatentable subject matter under § 101.
Mancy involved claims to a process of producing a particular known antibiotic by cultivating the
bacteria Streptomyces bifurcus. The claims had not been allowed on the ground that they were
nonobvious under 35 U.S.C. § 103, because various other strains of Streptomyces were also
used for the same purpose. The C.C.P.A. reversed, holding that In re Kuehl, 475 F.2d 658,
177 U.S.P.Q. 250 (C.C.P.A. 1973), was controlling and that the new strain (S. bifurcus) that
Mancy discovered could not be viewed as prior art in determining the obviousness of his claim
under § 103. The dicta that the PTO relied upon was the CCPA's comparison of Mancy to
Kuehl:
We recognize the difference between this case and the situation in Kuehl, where
the novel zeolite used as a catalyst in the claimed hydrocarbon cracking processes
was itself the subject of allowed claims in the application. Here appellants not only
have no allowed claims to the novel strain of Streptromyces used in their process
but would, we presume (without deciding), be unable to obtain such a claim be-
cause the strain, while new in the sense that it is not shown by any art of record, is,
as we understand, it, a "product of nature". However, it is not required for unobvi-
ousness of the method-of-use claims that the new starting material be patentable.
In re Mancy, 499 F.2d at 1294, 182 U.S.P.Q. at 306. In Bergy, the court made it clear that in
Mancy it was not expressing any view on the patentability of living organisms as such:
[Tihe thought underlying our presumption that Mancy could not have obtained a
claim to the strain of microorganism he had described was simply that it lacked
novelty. We were thinking of something preexisting and merely plucked from the
earth and claimed as such, a far cry from a biologically pure culture produced by
great labor in a laboratory and so claimed. . . . [I]n light of what we have learned in
this case about the separation and identification of new strains of Streptomyces . . .
our dictum was ill-considered. Had we known what we now know, we would likely
have abjured the stated presumption.
596 F.2d at 976, 201 U.S.P.Q. at 374 (emphasis in original).
In Guaranty Trust, the court upheld a patent for a process for the production of acetone and
butyl alcohol by bacteriological fermentation. In so doing, the court observed:
Lastly, the defendant contends that the invention of the Weizmann patent is unpat-
entable since it is for the life process of a living organism. Were the patent for
bacteria per se, a different situation would be presented. As before stated, the
patent is not for bacteria per se. It is for a fermentation process employing bacteria
discovered by Weizmann under conditions set forth in the specifications and claims.
Undoubtedly there is patentable subject matter in the invention.
Guaranty Trust Co. of N.Y. v. Union Solvents Corp., 54 F.2d at 410, 12 U.S.P.Q. at 57. In
Bergy, the court deemed this dicta "a trite observation of minimal magnitude as precedent,
dealing with a non-issue on which no opinion was expressed." 596 F.2d at 977, 201 U.S.P.Q. at
374.
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Bergy is simply an interpretation of section 101 that the court is free to
make without a signal from Congress.8 7
Judge Miller, in his dissent, however, did not agree 8" with the majority
and felt that the passage quoted from Deepsouth was the essential thrust of
the Court's opinion in Flook. He interpreted the passage as an indication
that "where there is a basis for substantial doubt over the intent of Congress
regarding the breadth of the language in the statute, the court will await a
'clear and certain signal from Congress' on the subject." 89  The basis for
substantial doubt, in his opinion, was whether Congress intended inventions
embodying organisms to be embraced by the words "manufacture" or "com-
position of matter." Judge Miller's doubt stems from his belief that Con-
gress, by passing the Plant Patent Act of 1930, clearly did not intend that
any organisms, other than plants, be within the scope of section 101. If
Congress had intended otherwise it would not have enacted the legisla-
tion, because Congress is presumed not to legislate unnecessarily. 90
The Plant Patent Act of 1930, however, is inconclusive as evidence that
section 101 was not meant to encompass living organisms when claimed as
either manufactures or compositions of matter. The intent of a previous
Congress cannot be inferred by looking to the legislative history of the Plant
Patent Act. To do so is to attribute an intent to a preceding Congress which
the members of that Congress did not themselves state. The Supreme Court
has consistently frowned on this practice, 91 and, as the court in Bergy
noted, it "is not even rational speculation." '92
Also, the explicit purpose of the Plant Patent Act should be viewed from an
historical perspective. g American agriculture at the turn of the century
was experiencing difficulties, causing the farm lobby to petition Congress for
relief. 94 Plant breeding at that time was, essentially, in an embryonic state
87. "Faced with the necessity of rendering a decision one way or the other on whether
these inventions are encompassed by § 101, there being no prior decisions to guide us, we
merely carry out our normal judicial function in deciding to say yes rather than no." Id. at 987,
201 U.S.P.Q. at 383.
88. 596 F.2d at 999-1002, 201 U.S.P.Q. at 392-95 (Miller, J., dissenting).
89. Id. at 999, 201 U.S.P.Q. at 392 (Miller, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original).
90. Id. As support for this premise, Judge Miller cited Platt v. Union Pacific R.R., 99 U.S.
48, 58 (1878); Skovgaard v. M/V Tungus, 252 F.2d 14, 17 (3d Cir. 1957), aff'd. 358 U.S. 588
(1959); United States v. Korpan, 237 F.2d 676, 680 (7th Cir. 1956), rev'd on other grounds, 354
U.S. 271 (1957); In re Finch, 535 F.2d 70, 71, 190 U.S.P.Q. 64, 65 (C.C.P.A. 1976); United
States v. C.J. Tower & Sons, 44 C.C.P.A. 1, 5 C.A.D. 626 (1956).
91. The Supreme Court has consistently and unequivocably concluded that "the views of a
subsequent Congress form a hazardous basis for inferring the intent of an earlier one." United
States v. Price, 361 U.S. 304, 313 (1960). Accord, United States v. Southwestern Cable Co., 392
U.S. 157, 170 (1968); United States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 348-49 (1963);
Rainwater v. United States, 356 U.S. 590, 593 (1958); United States v. United Mine Workers,
330 U.S. 258, 281-82 (1947).
92. 596 F.2d at 980, 201 U.S.P.Q. at 377.
93. "[S]tatutes are construed by the courts with reference to the circumstances existing at
the time of passage." United States v. Wise, 370 U.S. 405, 411 (1962).
94. 596 F.2d at 981, 201 U.S.P.Q. at 378.
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and had not yet developed into an industry. 95  By passing the Plant Patent
Act, Congress felt that agricultural development would be placed on an equal
economic basis with industry. 96 Thus, the intent of Congress in passing the
legislation was to extend the patent system to what was then a non-industrial
area. 97 The fact that plants were alive was completely ignored.
The Plant Patent Act also helped spur agricultural development by avoid-
ing any deterrence resulting from faulty judicial interpretation. 98 Until
plant breeding began its growth, the Patent Office had rejected patents for
plants as products of nature.99 The Plant Patent Act simply avoided any
possible judicial disagreement over whether or not plants produced by
breeding were products of nature. 100 Another problem that was avoided by
passing the Act was compliance with the written description requirements of
the existing statutes. The amended statute insured that no plant patent
would be declared invalid for noncompliance with the description require-
95. Id. at 982, 201 U.S.P.Q. at 378-79.
96. Id.
97. Id. This premise was set forth in both the House and the Senate reports:
I. Purposes of the Bill
The purpose of the bill is to afford agriculture, as far as practicable, the same oppor-
tunity to participate in the benefits of the patent system as has been given industry,
and thus assist in placing agriculture on a basis of economic equality with industry.
The bill will remove the exisiting discrimination between plant developers and in-
dustrial inventors.
S. REP. No. 315, 71st Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1930); H.R. REP. No. 1129, 71st Cong., 2d Sess. 1
(1930).
98. 596 F.2d at 982, 201 U.S.P.Q. at 379.
99. The controlling law in the Patent Office at that time with respect to plants was Ex Parte
Latimer, 1889 Dec. Com. Pat. 123, 46 Off. Gaz. Pat. Office 1638 (1889). In Latimer, a claim
directed to the fiber of the needle of the tree Pinus australis was rejected on the ground that it
was a product of nature:
It cannot be said that the applicant in this case has made any discovery, or is
entitled to patent the idea, or fact, rather, that fiber can be found in the needle of
the Pinus australis, or that it is a longer fiber than can be found in other leaves, or
that it possesses more or less strength or fineness, because the mere ascertaining of
the character or quality of trees that grow in the forest and the construction of the
woody fiber and tissue of which they are composed is not a patentable invention,
recognized by the statute, any more than to find a new gem or jewel in the earth
would entitle the discoverer to patent all gems which should be subsequently
found .... The result would be that ... patents might be obtained upon the trees of
the forest and the plants of the earth, which of course would be unreasonable and
impossible ....
[Tihe fiber ... is a natural product and can no more be the subject of a patent in its
natural state when freed from its surroundings than wheat which has been cut by a reaper
or by some new method of reaping can be patented as wheat cut by such a process.
Id. at 125-27.
100. In concluding that the product of nature argument would be inapplicable to asexually
produced plants both the Senate and House reports stated:
A plant discovery resulting from cultivation is unique, isolated, and is not repeated by
nature, nor can it be reproduced by nature unaided by man .... It is obvious that
nature originally creates plants but it cannot be denied that man often controls and
directs the natural processes and produces a desired result .... Furthermore,
there is no apparent difference, for instance, between the part played by the plant
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ments. 101 In Bergy the court noted10 2 that no such modification of existing
patent law was necessary to accommodate the patenting of industrially useful
microorganisms.
The court in Bergy also strongly resisted the notion that it was extending
the patent laws. 103 In support of this contention, the court noted that even
though the issue involved in Bergy was one of first impression in the courts,
it was not new to the PTO. For example, in 1873, Louis Pasteur obtained a
United States patent for "[y]east, free from organic germs of disease, as an
article of manufacture."' 0 4 The court also noted several other patents ob-
tained on living matter claimed as compositions of matter. 105 Because the
PTO already had issued several patents pertaining to living organisms, the
ruling in Bergy did not expand the patent laws. Indeed, the PTO's position
was inconsistent with its own ruling on Chakrabarty's claims. One of the
claims allowed by the PTO had been directed to Chakrabarty's bacterium
carried on the straw,' 06 the preferred method of application. (The bacteria
carried on the straw is still alive.) The only difference between that claim
and the rejected claim was that the latter represents a patent on "life itself"
while the former does not. Apparently, this distinction bothered the PTO.
The fact remains, however, that the allowed claim contained living or-
ganisms and was considered by the PTO to be patentable subject matter
under section 101 as either a manufacture or a composition of matter. 107
The court in Bergy also noted several cases where claims to processes
involving living organisms or their life processes were considered to be pat-
entable subject matter under section 101. 108 The process claims of both
originator in the development of new plants and the part played by the chemist in
the development of new compositions of matter.
S. REP. No. 315, supra note 97, at 6-7; H.R. REP. No. 1129, supra note 97, at 6-7.
101. 35 U.S.C. § 162 (1976) provides in part that "[n]o plant patent shall be declared invalid
for noncompliance with section 102 of this title if the description is as complete as is reasonably
possible."
102. 596 F.2d at 984, 201 U.S.P.Q. at 380. The court in Bergy noted that the microorganism
inventions of both Bergy and Chakrabarty were described and claimed so as to comply with the
written description and claiming provisions of 35 U.S.C. § 112 (1976).
103. 596 F.2d at 984-87, 201 U.S.P.Q. at 381-83.
104. Id. at 985, 201 U.S.P.Q. at 381. This claim is the subject of the United States Patent
141,072, claim 2. Id.
105. The Bergy court cited DAus, BOND & ROSE, Microbiological Plant Patents, 10 IDEA
87 (1966). This article presented a critical examination of the CCPA's decision in In re
Arzberger, 112 F.2d 834, 46 U.S.P.Q. 32 (C.C.P.A. 1940), where the court held that bacteria
were not covered under the Plant Patent Act of 1930. The authors (all Assistant Examiners in
the United States Patent Office) listed several existing patents drawn to living organisms and
cultures used in foods, insecticides, and vaccines. 10 IDEA at 94-95 n.36, 596 F.2d at 85-86, 201
U.S.P.Q. at 381-82.
106. This was Chakrabarty's claim 30. See. note 42 supra.
107. 596 F.2d at 986, 201 U.S.P.Q. at 382.
108. Id. at 977. See City of Milwaukee v. Activated Sludge, Inc., 69 F.2d 577, 21 U.S.P.Q.
69 (7th Cir. 1934), cert. denied, 293 U.S. 576 (1934) (bacteriological purification of sewage);
Cameron Septic Tank Co. v. Village of Saratoga Springs, 159 F. 453 (2d Cir. 1908) (the original
septic tank case; bacterial action process claims were held valid and infringed); Dick v. Lederle
Antitoxin Laboratories, 43 F.2d 628, 6 U.S.P.Q. 40 (S.D.N.Y. 1930) (process for producing
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Bergy and Chakrabarty were allowed and they too encompassed living or-
ganisms. 109 In Bergy, the court felt that it was illogical to insist that the
existence of life in a manufacture or a composition of matter removed it from
patentable subject matter under section 101 while the utilization of living
organisms in processes did not affect their status under section 101.110
THE IMPACT OF BERGY
The Bergy decision has opened the door to patent protection for the
products of recombinant DNA research,"' a relatively new 12 and highly
controversial technology that exhibits tremendous potential for social benefit.
The granting of such patent protection should prove to be a major impetus
to the advancement of this technology in accordance with the constitutionally
stated purpose of the patent laws. 113 While not involved in Bergy's inven-
tion, 114 recombinant DNA research is the technology that Chakrabarty
utilized to develop his oil-eating microorganism. 115 Other biologists have
utilized recombinant DNA techniques to fashion microorganisms that can
manufacture human insulin and antivirus compounds, synthesize vaccines
and break down industrial waste. 116 At this time, there appears to be no
tipper limit to the potential of recombinant DNA research.
The controversy surrounding recombinant DNA stems from fears ex-
pressed by many that it creates biohazards as well as benefits. 117 Because
these organisms are fashioned in a laboratory and are not the natural prod-
ucts of evolutionary processes, other living things may lack adequate natural
defenses to any pathogenic1 18 tendencies of those organisms. Thus, the in-
advertent or even purposeful release of the organisms into the environment
scarlet fever antitoxin by injecting an animal with sterile toxin and obtaining the antitoxin there-
from). See also In re Mancy, 499 F.2d 1289, 182 U.S.P.Q. 303 (C.C.P.A. 1974) (process for
producing antibiotic using previously unknown microorganisms); Ex parte Prescott, 19
U.S.P.Q. 178 (Pat. Off. Bd. App. 1932) (bacteriological production of butyl and isopropyl al-
cohol).
109. See notes 41, 42, 53 and accompanying text supra.
110. 596 F.2d at 977, 201 U.S.P.Q. at 375.
111. DNA (deoxyribonucleic acid) is the basic genetic material of all living organisms. Re-
combinant DNA is the process of taking genes from one organism and splicing them into the
genes of another. See VAN NOSTRAND'S SCIENTIFIC ENCYCLOPEDIA 1894-96 (5th ed. 1976).
112". See NEWSWEEK, August 20, 1979, at 53. Recombinant DNA technology was perfected
only six years ago.
113. See note 2 supra.
114. The technology utilized by Bergy to develop his invention involves the culturing of
microorganisms. This technology, not "new" in any sense, has been existent since the time of
Louis Pasteur (1870's). 596 F.2d at 985, 201 U.S.P.Q. at 381.
115. Id. at 968-71, 201 U.S.P.Q. at 367-69.
116. See NEWSWEEK, August 20, 1979, at 53.
117. See generally J. GOODFIELD, PLAYING GOD (1977); J. RICHARDS, RECOMBINANT DNA:
SCIENCE, ETHICS AND POLITICS (1978); M. ROGERS, BIOHAZARD (1977); Curtiss, Genetic Ma-
nipulation of Microorganisms: Potential Benefits and Biohazards, 30 ANN. REv. OF MICRtOBIOL-
Ocy 507 (1976).
118. A pathogen is "a specific causative agent (as a bacterium or virus) of disease." WEBSTER'S
THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 1655 (1961).
[Vol. 29:215
1979] IN RE BERGY
may have devastating effects of unknown proportions. 119 As a result of
these fears, recombinant DNA research has been the subject of several
community hearings and has been studied by the Congress. 120 In addition,
the National Institute of Health (NIH) has issued guidelines 121 which, if
followed, greatly lessen the risks by requiring escape-proof labs and
weakened strains of bacteria that cannot survive outside the laboratory.
Despite these attempts to provide adequate safeguards for recombinant
DNA research, the controversy has continued 122 and may well have been a
factor in the PTO's position against providing patent protection to microor-
ganism inventions. The court in Bergy, however, correctly realized that the
proper forum for such debate is the legislature and not the courts. 123 Mi-
croorganism inventions are now patentable subject matter under section 101.
If Congress decides that certain microorganism inventions (i.e., the products
of recombinant DNA research) are not deserving of patent protection be-
cause the potential hazards outweigh the benefits, Congress can exclude
such inventions from patent protection. 124 Even if such legislation is
enacted, however, Bergy still will provide patent protection for a wide range
of industrially useful microorganisms.
119. See Wade, Dicing with Nature: Three Narrow Escapes, 195 Sci. 378 (1977). The author
reports on three incidents illustrating the potential hazards of recombinant DNA. Interestingly,
one of the incidents involved Dr. Chakrabarty. Chakrabarty had put a gene for cellulase (an
enzyme that breaks down the plant structural protein cellulose which is indigestible by humans
and therefore gives bulk to the feces) into the bacterium Escherichia coli (a common inhabitant
of the human gut). Chakrabarty had planned to insert methane-forming genes into the bac-
terium so that it could turn wastes such as sewage sludge directly into usable methane gas.
Theorists warned, however, that should such an E. coli spread throughout the population, a
large number of people might contract chronic or even fatal diarrhea. Because of this possiblity,
Chakrabarty destroyed the bug. Id.
120. See Recombinant DNA Research of 1977: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Health and
the Environment of the House Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 95th Cong., 1st
Sess. (1977).
121. See Guidelines for Research Involving Recombinant DNA Molecules, 41 Fed. Reg.
27902 (1976); Recombinant DNA Research: Revised Guidelines, 43 Fed. Reg. 60080 (1978).
These guidelines, however, apply only to federally funded research. In order to induce private
industry to voluntarily comply with the guidelines, the Assistant Secretary of Commerce for
Science and Technology requested that the PTO accord special status to patent applications
involving recombinant DNA. See Recombinant DNA: Accelerated Processing of Patent Applica-
tions for Inventions, 42 Fed. Reg. 2712 (1977), suspended in part by Recombinant DNA: Sus-
pension of Accelerated Processing of Patent Applications for Recombinant DNA Research Inven-
tions, 42 Fed. Reg. 13147 (1977).
122. See generally Berger, Government Regulation of the Pursuit of Knowledge: The Recom-
binant DNA Controversy, 3 VT. L. REV. 83 (1978).
123. 596 F.2d at 986-87, 201 U.S.P.Q. at 382-83.
124. Congressional legislation prohibiting patent protection for certain inventions would not
be a new thing. For example, under the 1954 Atomic Energy Act, Act of Aug. 30, 1954, ch. 13
68 Stat. 943, the patenting of certain inventions relating to nuclear energy is prohibited. The
provision currently is codified in 42 U.S.C. § 2181 (1976) and states in part: "No patent shall
hereafter be granted for any invention or discovery which is useful solely in the utilization of
special nuclear material or atomic energy in an atomic weapon."
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The effect of recombinant DNA research is the development of useful or-
ganisms through the recombination of various desired genetic properties of
different organisms. An alternative means of combining the genetic proper-
ties of species without the expense and the dangers inherent in recombinant
DNA involves mixed-culture systems of microorganisms. 125 These systems,
however, are likely to create certain problems not evident in monoculture
systems like Bergy's and Chakrabarty's.
The problems with mixed-culture systems are likely to surface with regard
to the specification requirements of section 112. 126 That section provides
that an inventor's specification sufficiently describe the claimed invention to
enable one skilled in the art to reproduce it. In the case of microorganism
inventions, these requirements are best satisfied by depositing a sample of
the microorganism in a suitable depository where the microorganism can be
maintained in a culture. In such a patent deposition, it is often desirable and
usually necessary to be able clearly to identify and name the microorganism
in a culture. While this may be fairly simple for a monoculture, it becomes
much more complicated for mixed cultures. The ideal solution is to de-
scribe and deposit separately the component species of the mixture, a solution
that may not be feasible for mixed cultures, where some of the component
species are obligate symbionts. 127 In such a situation, it may be acceptable
to deposit the culture as a mixture but it must still be readily stored and
maintained under culture collection conditions. Again, there may be numer-
ous difficulties in the case of complex mixed cultures because certain storage
conditions may selectively kill one or more of the component species of the
mixture.
In Bergy, the court did not foresee any problems with microorganism in-
ventions meeting the requirements of section 112. 128 Thus, although the
court correctly decided the issue of monoculture systems of Bergy and Chak-
rabarty, the court erred in its failure to address the problems attendant upon
more complex mixed-culture systems.
Another consideration concerning the deposition problems is that the vast
majority of the microorganisms currently on deposit are commonly occur-
ring, easily isolatable, and relatively easy to maintain in a culture. 129 As
further exploitation of these microorganisms becomes increasingly difficult,
microbiological advances are likely to result in the appearance of more exotic
and fastidious130 kinds of microorganisms. 131 In many instances, curators of
125. See generally Harrison, Mixed Cultures in Industrial Fermentation Processes, 24 ADV.
IN App. MICROBIOLOGY 129 (1978).
126. 35 U.S.C. § 112 (1976).
127. Symbiosis is "the condition of two or more different organisms living together in close
association." An obligate symbiont, therefore, is "one which cannot exist apart from its part-
ner." P. GRAY, THE DICTIONARY OF THE BIOLOGICAL SCIENCES 53 (1967).
128. 596 F.2d at 984, 201 U.S.P.Q. at 380.
129. See generally Pridham & Hesseltine, Culture Collections and Patent Depositions, 19
ADV. IN App. MICROBIOLOGY 1 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Pridham & Hesseltine].
130. A fastidious microorganism is one "having complex nutritional requirements." WEB-
STER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 827 (1961).
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the depositories may not be able to work with these microorganisms because
the handling of such materials may exceed their expertise or limitations.
Thus, because the curators have a responsibility to both the patentee and to
the public, depositories may be forced to limit the types of microorganism
inventions that they can accept. It may be desirable, therefore, for the PTO
to establish special depositories designed and equipped to cope with these
problems.
Thus far the discussion has concerned only the present impact of Bergy
given the current state of biotechnology. It is interesting to speculate, how-
ever, on what sort of living inventions will be eligible for patent protection
now and in the future, and whether Bergy will be extended beyond mi-
croorganisms to higher life forms. The most likely candidates for patent pro-
tection will be animals that may have a marketable value either through the
direct use of the animal or its byproducts. The majority of living inven-
tions most likely will be aimed at solving the problems caused by the rapidly
increasing size of the human population. Solutions will be required in the
development of useful drugs for the treatment of disease, in handling munic-
ipal and industrial wastes, and most importantly, in the development of
adequate food resources. The majority of the industrial applications will in-
volve microorganism inventions, as is presently the case, because they are
easier to manipulate and much more versatile than higher life forms. With
regard to food, however, as conventional resources prove to be inadequate
due to limitations of space and energy, science will develop more exotic and
unconventional foods involving a wide range of plants and animals from mi-
croorganisms to livestock. 132
At present, it is doubtful that life forms other than microorganisms will be
eligible for patent protection due to their inability to satisfy one of the re-
quirements of section 112, namely, the enabling disclosure that teaches one
skilled in the art how to make and how to use the claimed invention. 133 In
131. See Pridham & Hesseltine, supra note 129, at 9. The authors expect that "human,
animal, and plant pathogens; extreme thermophiles or psychrophiles; diatoms; protozoa;
nematodes; viruses; and cell lines of all kinds will appear among patent deposition strains in
the years to come." Id.
132. See generally Kharatyan, Microbes as Food for Humans, 32 ANN, REV. OF MICROBIOL-
OGY 301 (1978) (microbes may someday be a major source of protein either by direct human
consumption or indrectly as a more efficient feed for livestock); Rhyther and Goldman, Microbes
as Food in Mariculture, 29 ANN. REV. OF MICROBIOLOGY 429 (1975) (in mariculture or sea-
farming, certain aquatic organisms like clams, oysters and scallops are cultured in large tanks
using microorganisms as a principal food source).
In addition to these unconventional sources of food, developments also will be seen in con-
ventional sources. Genetic advances may someday allow the development of animals of superior
nutritional value not now possible through traditional methods of hybridization. In agriculture,
increasing genetic uniformity in crop plants has increased their vulnerability to pathogens
thereby requiring increased use of pesticides. As the disastrous side-effects of these pesticides
has become known, science has looked to the possibility of biological pest control, i.e., develop-
ing insects that are natural predators of a particular pest.
133. 35 U.S.C. § 112 (1976). See note 39 supra for the pertinent part of section 112.
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particular, problems will arise with regard to reproducing the invention. Be-
cause a written description of a living organism is generally insufficient to
enable one skilled in the art to reproduce it, a sample of the organism must
be made available. While depositories exist for the maintenance of microor-
ganisms, it would be a practical impossibility to maintain higher life forms in
a genetically unaltered state for indefinite periods. Given certain technologi-
cal advancements, however, these problems may disappear. The technology
of cloning is already feasible in some higher life forms' 3 4 and may someday
be applicable to a wide range of animals. Advances in cloning combined with
improved storage techniques that would allow a viable tissue sample to be
stored indefinitely without genetic damage would make the deposit of animal
inventions a practical reality. Until that time, however, if it ever comes at
all, patent protection for living inventions will be limited to microorganism
inventions.
THE PREDICTED OUTCOME OF BERGY IN THE SUPREME COURT
The Supreme Court's forthcoming decision in Parker v. Bergy is depen-
dent on the Court's reasons for granting certiorari. Because the Court issued
no directives when it remanded Bergy to the CCPA, 135 these reasons are
not readily apparent.
The most likely explanation concerns the economic implications of Bergy.
The genetic industry is presently in an infant stage and is likely to become a
billion-dollar industry. Thus, it is desirable for the Supreme Court to rule on
Bergy to resolve whatever confusion may exist in the wake of the CCPA's
decision.
One possible source of confusion concerns the fact that lawsuits testing the
validity of a patent are brought in federal district courts. 136 On occasion,
these district courts may invalidate claims previously held valid by the
CCPA. Thus, a Supreme Court ruling will require consistency between the
CCPA and the district courts regarding patent protection for living or-
ganisms.
Another source of confusion arises from the apparent disagreement be-
tween the Supreme Court and the CCPA concerning the Court's analysis of
the patent statute in Flook. In Flook, the Court found Flook's algorithm to
be one of the basic tools of scientific research that must be considered to be
part of the prior art. 137 Because the only inventive aspect of Flook's inven-
tion was the algorithm, and because there was no other inventive concept in
its application, the claim was rejected. 138 This analysis was strongly
134. See generally R. McKINNELL, CLONING-NUCLEAR TRANSPLANTATION IN AMPHIBIA
(1978).
135. Parker v. Bergy, 438 U.S. 902, 198 U.S.P.Q. 257 (1978).
136. 28 U.S.C. § 1338 (1976).
137. Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 591-92, 198 U.S.P.Q. 193, 198 (1978).
138. Id. at 594, 198 U.S.P.Q. at 199.
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criticized by Justice Stewart, in his dissenting opinion, for "importing into its
inquiry under 35 U.S.C. § 101 the criteria of novelty and inventive-
ness." 1 39  The court in Bergy agreed with Justice Stewart and felt that, in
Flook, the Court had given to the term "prior art" an "entirely new dimen-
sion with consequences of unforeseeable magnitude." 140
In Flook, the Court rejected the notion that it had improperly imported
into section 101 the section 102 and section 103 criteria of novelty and in-
ventiveness. Rather, the Court emphasized that natural phenomena and
principles cannot be patented because "they are not the kinds of 'discoveries'
that the statute was enacted to protect." 1 4 1 In their petition for certiorari,
the PTO has said that "[1]iving things-whether naturally occurring, iso-
lated, or genetically engineered-are no more 'discoveries' of the kind the
statute was enacted to protect than are the mathematical principles involved
in Flook."142 Because this fundamental difference of opinion between the
PTO and the CCPA in their interpretation of Flook is likely to cause consid-
erable confusion in the administration of the patent laws, 143 Supreme Court
review of Bergy is warranted.
While the criticisms of the Court's analysis in Flook are valid, the Su-
preme Court can minimize the confusion by expressly stating that Flook
should apply only to abstract principles like Flook's algorithm and not to
tangible phenomenon like the microorganisms of Bergy. To hold otherwise
would overrule established precedent concerning the patenting of purified
products of nature. 144 Thus, upon review of Bergy, the Supreme Court
139. Id. at 600, 198 U.S.P.Q. at 201 (Stewart, J., dissenting). Justice Stewart was joined in
his dissent by Chief Justice Burger and Justice Rehnquist.
140. 596 F.2d at 965, 201 U.S.P.Q. at 365.
[T]he .. . novel Flook doctrine ma' have an unintended impact in putting an
untimely and unjustifiable end to the longstanding proposition of law that patent-
ability may be predicated on discovering the cause of a problem even though, once
that cause is known, the solution is brought about by obvious means. Such causes
may often be classed as laws of nature or their effects .... The potential for great
harm to the incentives of the patent system is apparent.
It is one thing to say that a principle, natural cause, or formula, per se, is not
within the categories of 101, but quite another to say it is "prior art" in determining
the nonobviousness of an invention predicated on it even though the inventor dis-
covered it.
Id. at 966, 201 U.S.P.Q. at 365.
141. 437 U.S. at 593, 198 U.S.P.Q. at 198.
142. 439 BNA's PATENT, TRADEMARK & COPYRIGHT JOURNAL D-4 (1979).
143. As evidence that the Supreme Court's analysis in Flook is resulting in confusion, see In
re Diehr, 446 BNA's PATENT, TRADEMARK & COPYRIGHT JOURNAL A-1 (1979). In Diehr, the
CCPA held that a claim may not be rejected as non-statutory subject matter "merely because it
involves a computer program or is computer-related." Id. (emphasis in original). In so doing the
court was also forced to clarify that " [c]onsiderations of novelty and obviousness have no bearing
on compliance with § 101." Id. at A-2; a notion which apparently arose from Flook.
144. See Kiley, Common Sense and the Uncommon Bacterium-Is "Life" Patentable? 60 J.
PAT. OFF. Soc'Y 468, 472-73 (1978):
[E]xtension of Flook to pre-existing organisms requires the same extension to pre-
existing things. Then to the extent anything predates its discovery, it is unpatenta-
ble in isolated form, whether aspirin, or adrenalin, or vitamin B-12. This would
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should affirm the CCPA's conclusion that living organisms are patentable
subject matter under section 101 when claimed as either manufactures or
compositions of matter.
CONCLUSION
In Bergy, a court has held for the first time that living organisms are
patentable subject matter under section 101 as either manufactures or com-
positions of matter, notwithstanding its reconsideration in light of Flook. The
court in Bergy was entirely correct in holding that the Flook opinion had
absolutely no bearing whatsoever on the "issue" in Bergy. Because the ar-
guments offered to show why living organisms are not patentable subject
matter under section 101 are unpersuasive, the Supreme Court should affirm
the CCPA's decision in Bergy. The Supreme Court's affirmance is also re-
quired by the economic importance of recombinant DNA research and the
impact Bergy will have on its advancement. In Bergy, the court underesti-
mated the difficulties that will be encountered in meeting certain of the
specification requirements of section 112, especially in connection with com-
plex mixed cultures and exotic microorganisms. For the same reasons,
Bergy, in the near future, should be limited to granting patent protection to
microorganism inventions and should be extended to higher life forms only
when the technology needed to maintain them in depositories is developed.
The idea clearly has been established, however, that one now can own a
living invention.
Joseph Drazek
reduce to denial of patents on 'products of nature' though they had never before
existed in isolated form, overturning a long line of authority to the contrary, and
then without regard to the positive good resulting from their isolation.
Id. (emphasis in original). See note 45 supra for some of the precedent that would be over-
turned.
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